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Summary
The purpose of this paper is to promote thinking on the nature of the relationship 
between the Visegrad States (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and 
to comprehend the circumstances, interests and motivations of the inter-state political 
alliances in Central Eastern Europe (“CEE”). The Visegrad Group is a regional po-
litical platform without a genuine institutional base. This paper seeks to identify the 
reason for the absence of an intention on the part of the Visegrad States to broaden, 
deepen or institutionalize their inter-state cooperation. Perhaps, these countries pre-
fer not to force the harmonization of their political actions if their interests do not 
necessarily meet. A closer look at the FDI inflows reported by these states and at the 
CEE  regional development cooperation possibilities, and a theoretical overview of 
intergovernmental cooperation in practice can help reveal how easily countries with 
similar geopolitical and economic positions may achieve common goals (as they un-
derstand each other’s problems better). Such countries, however, may also become 
competitors in specific fields. The V4 states cooperate multilaterally so long as the 
synchronization of their political moves generates roughly equal benefits for each. V4 
may be interpreted as a political tool for advancing the political interests of its mem-
ber states and not as a compulsory or permanent negotiating forum.
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Centripetal political forces among CEE countries
For the first time after the regime change, the Heads of the Republic of Hungary, the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Republic of Poland met in May 1990 to elab-
orate a new economic and political framework for an intergovernmental foreign policy 
partnership following the dismantling of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact. For the first time after long decades of soviet repression, 
the independent CEE governments entered into negotiations with one another without 
any external pressure. The representatives of the three governments agreed in a joint 
approach to the western international institutions at the Visegrad Summit of Febru-
ary 1991. That consensus served as a platform and a basis of their future and desired 
Euro-Atlantic integration. The Visegrad Countries started to develop a system of mutual 
political interactions in order to evidence their readiness to integrate in advanced inter-
national institutions like the European Communities or NATO (Bársony, 1998).
Despite minor discrepancies in attitudes and perceptions, the states of the region 
moved in the same political direction (accession to the EU, NATO, EBRD etc.) after 
the 1991 Visegrad Summit: they were interested in a proactive foreign policy and in 
advancing regional security in order to fill the vacuum left by the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact. After the removal of the Iron Curtain, the Visegrad States became the 
front-line applicants for accession to the European Community, and very similar in-
stitutional and structural reforms took place throughout the region (Péter, 2012:25). 
These four states adopted the transnational economic system simultaneously. The V4 
countries have similar historical, cultural, economic, political and military-strategic 
backgrounds, enabling them to use their comparative advantage of better under-
standing each other’s problems in international decision-making procedures. It can 
also be presumed that an increased interdependence reduces the chance of V4 states 
engaging in conflict (Jackson–Sorensen, 2007:103–104). These similarities allow the 
observer to see the V4 as a genuine group of countries.
Since the very beginning, the principal challenge for all Visegrad States has been 
trying to turn their relations, despite their traditionally different foreign policies, into 
a common strength.3 The Visegrad Countries might feel compelled to find common 
grounds in specific EU-related issues. Until March 2017, when the Council of the EU 
voted on proposals by the Commission or the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, 352 votes had been assigned to the member states, each with a cer-
tain number of votes weighted to reflect the size of their respective populations. As a re-
sult, in the aggregate, the Visegrad States had the same number of votes (58) as France 
and Germany combined (European Council & Council of the European Union, 2017). 
Thus, the Visegrad Four had a realistic chance of shaping Europe’s decision-making if 
the governments of all the four countries acted proactively and jointly (see Figure 1).
From November 2014, however, a new procedure for qualified majority voting, 
also known as the “double majority” rule, is used in the Council. In practice it means 
that 55 per cent of member states have to vote in favour and the proposal has to be 
supported by member states representing at least 65 per cent of the total population
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Figure 1: Qualified majority weighting prior to March 2017 
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Figure 2: Population of V4 countries (2017)
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of the EU. The former criterion is beneficial for small-sized member states, while the 
latter favours larger ones. Consequently, the V4 countries did not benefit from the 
changes: they include two medium-sized (the Czech Republic and Hungary), one 
larger (Poland) and one small (Slovakia) country.
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The four CEE states need to find allies in the Community to be able to enforce 
their interests related to Commission proposals and foreign affairs. As of now, 65 
per cent of the total EU population represents 332,673,310 people (2017 estimate).4 
This figure is more than five times higher than the estimated total population of the 
Visegrad States (63,784,690). Thus, the V4+ formula (the usual V4 countries plus Slo-
venia and/or Croatia, Austria) to support CEE interests in the EU institutions is more 
than crucial. The accession of the countries in the Western Balkans to the EU would 
be an indisputable advantage for the Visegrad Four group. The political interests of 
Central Europe (regional military and energy security, infrastructure development 
etc.) in many cases coincide with the ones of their south-eastern neighbours. A joint 
action would certainly multiply the decision-making power of smaller EU member 
states (Tóth, 2017a:8–10). In addition, in order to strengthen their macroeconomic 
competitiveness, the Visegrad Countries aim at implementing harmonized moderni-
zation policies with the best possible utilization of EU cohesion funds. This, again, is 
a field where their individual interests coincide, so they can achieve absolute gains in 
concert (Tóth, 2017a:6). Other fields of intergovernmental cooperation within the V4 
region are: food safety and quality issues, migration crises and the related EU policies 
(although their positions do not necessarily coincide), Schengen policies, EU–Cauca-
sus bilateral relations, cultural and educational, research and development projects 
etc. (Tóth, 2017b).
Support to the EU and NATO enlargements in the Western Balkans region has 
been one of the top priorities of the Visegrad Group. There are several examples 
of practical, political and economic assistance (twinning programs, interregional 
initiatives, EU Member States Consortia, Stabilization and Association Process tools, 
Western Balkans Fund, NATO’s “Open-Doors” policy etc.) provided by the V4 states, 
both individually and collectively, to Post-Yugoslav countries and to Albania in or-
der to facilitate the accession process (Visegradgroup.eu, 2014). Central European 
countries strive to increase their “soft diplomacy” activities in the Western Balkan 
region through the International Visegrad Fund (“IVF”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, 2017). The Visegrad Countries can offer their expertise in deepening 
cross-border cooperation with future EU member states.
The Visegrad formula, through its successful security-related and economic inte-
gration, has become a model followed by the countries that recently joined NATO and 
the EU (Bútora, 2011). The European integration of the Western Balkan region is still 
under way, and one of the major preconditions for accession is the establishment of 
stable regional partnerships. Western Balkans states might need to adopt a “Visegrad-
style” multilateral negotiating forum for a non-compulsory and non-permanent in-
tergovernmental dialogue. The effectiveness of a regional political cooperation does 
not necessarily depend on the depth of institutional structures. The outcomes of such 
partnerships could be the results of mere cost-effectiveness analyses.
It is presumed that the historical east–west axis in CEE geopolitics can only be al-
tered by closer ties with the Balkans. Given their predetermined geopolitical situation, 
bargaining position, economical weight and socio-political experiences, a genuine 
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(non-EU and non-NATO) V4 approach to the Western Balkans may serve as one of 
the few chances for these states to act deliberately in a non-predetermined way in the 
European arena. To this end, Budapest, Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw make efforts 
at harmonizing their political actions. Since 2009 each high-ranking Visegrad Four 
summit has addressed Western Balkans-related questions and V4–Western Balkans 
foreign ministerial meetings have been organized on an annual basis ever since (Tóth, 
2015:25–28).
Case study 1: Regional development cooperation – The Via Carpathia initiative
The efficiency of a regional development cooperation depends primarily on the com-
plexity of socio-economic processes and the harmony of different development fac-
tors. Hence it is crucial to integrate national and subnational levels connecting dif-
ferent areas (economic and financial, geographical, scientific and technical, moral 
and historical, natural, social, infrastructure, legal and institutional, political, and 
strategic; Baranyi, 2013). The Europeanization of non-EU member states has been 
a key factor in regional political partnerships in the CEE  area and the related ac-
tivities have strengthened cohesion between member and candidate states. Moreover, 
Europeanization may help create a regional identity. A collective regional inter-state 
decision-making can be perceived also as an opportunity to overcome transnational 
challenges, to boost the economy in marginalized sectors, to build up efficient infra-
structures across state borders and to bring people from different countries together 
(Centre for Democracy Studies, 2015).
The improvement of transport infrastructure is one of the most significant con-
ditions for sustainable development. Mainly due to the expansion of bilateral trade 
between Germany and the V4 countries since 1990, supply chains have primarily been 
formed on the east–west axis in this region. There have been initiatives to create sup-
ply chains along the north–south axis too, but so far there is no genuine north–south 
traffic corridor in the Eastern part of the EU (Lønsetteig, 2017).
Via Carpathia is a planned European north–south transborder transport route 
running along the eastern border of the EU, connecting Lithuania, Poland, Slova-
kia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. The construction of the trail was origi-
nally initiated by the Polish government (China–CEEC, 2016). Via Carpathia would 
cross the west–east corridors leading from Western Europe to Russia and Central Asia 
and link the Black Sea ports with the TRACECA  trail (Europe, the Caucasus and 
Asia).5 One of its major advantages is that it would connect the Eastern and less devel-
oped economic areas of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. The project aims at improv-
ing communication and transportation of goods between the Baltic and the Aegean 
Seas (Centre for Transport Strategies, 2016); stimulating and accelerating economic 
growth in less developed regions of the countries involved; breaking down logistics 
obstacles; providing impetus for the free movement of persons, goods, and services; 
fostering cross-border cooperation and opening up new supply chains; supporting 
the development of local SMEs; boosting trade in the fast-moving consumer goods; 
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as well as supporting tourism industry in the region. A higher level of connectivity in-
creases standards of living as it impedes the movement of workforce from the region, 
supports the creation of new workplaces and it attracts new investments (Nagy, 2016).
In October 2006 representatives of Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary met 
at the “One Way – Four Countries” intergovernmental conference in Łańcut, Poland 
to discuss the demand for an integrated, sustainable and efficient transport infra-
structure that would provide connectivity to the Carpathian, the Baltic, as well as the 
Danube macro-regions. In October 2010 Bulgaria, Romania and Greece also joined 
the initiative. In 2016 the parties signed the second Łańcut Declaration on the exten-
sion of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) by establishing the shortest 
highway route on the North–South axis connecting Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Hungary (The Łańcut Declaration, 2016).6
Centrifugal forces
Once the Visegrad Forum does not prove to be effective enough anymore, the gov-
ernments involved opt for using other intergovernmental political means to achieve 
their goals (Slavkov and Weimar triangles, CEFTA, CEI, Salzburg Forum, EU Danube 
Region Initiative etc.). This shift to other international diplomatic fora, however, does 
not mean these governments wish to quit the Visegrad formula in other fields of their 
cooperation. These states do not ignore the former V4 achievements when their gov-
ernments decide that a specific international political issue is not to be approached 
through the Visegrad formula.
After the fall of communism there was a significant military and economic secu-
rity vacuum in CEE  and the intention of these countries to join the Euro-Atlantic 
international organizations as soon as possible was the main driving force behind the 
partnership of Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw (Światłowski, 2015). These 
governments, however, have always had slightly different political rationales in prior-
itizing different strategic objectives.
Not many years after the foundation of the Visegrad platform, the initial enthusi-
asm for cooperation started to slowly disappear, and particular approaches were born. 
The CEE countries’ desire to join the European integration ahead of others had a sort 
of disruptive effect that fostered rivalry as opposed to pursuing synergies within the 
region. When one wants to understand the centrifugal forces in the V4 region after 
the down of the Cold War, the so called “Four fears of the CEE states” have to be taken 
into consideration (the order is indifferent):
1. To become a buffer zone between the NATO and Russia
2. To turn to an alternative to the European integration instead of being a means 
of reaching the desired accession
3. The burden of less developed partner states as an obstacle to the Euro-Atlantic 
integration
4. To put limits to the liberty of foreign policy-making shortly after regaining sov-
ereignty (Lengyel, 2006:162).
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The Czech foreign policy has always been focusing on Germany. As the country 
does not border with any of the post-Soviet or post-Yugoslav states, it has different 
geopolitical ambitions and interests then the rest of the V4 states. Prague’s diplomacy 
has always been driven by pragmatism, cost-effectiveness, and particular ideologies 
(e.g. the Czech opt-out policies related to certain EU regulations). Poland has close 
relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, as these territories represent former 
parts and current neighbours of the country. Prague’s political activity was primarily 
focusing on identifying individual ways of the Euro-Atlantic integration and supplying 
development assistance to the Western Balkans region, while the unique position of 
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia determined their eastern orientation. The Czech Re-
public, Hungary, and Slovakia have consciously followed pendulum politics between 
Western Europe (Germany) and Russia, while Poland still gives a great emphasis to 
protection from Russian influence in Eastern Europe. And, of course, the geopoliti-
cal foci of each individual V4 country have constantly changed from time to time ac-
cording to the changes in their governments, as different leaderships have prioritized 
different key issues.
On the other hand, these states have been in competition with one another for 
Western financial and security aids and resources (Bársony, 1998). This was, how-
ever, nothing new under the sun. Before the 1990 regime change, economic relations 
within the region had been nothing but a forced interdependent harmonious system 
of Moscow’s satellite states (CMEA), where the individual bilateral connections to the 
Soviet Union had always been more significant than the multilateral relations with 
one another (Newnham, 2002:144). So the Visegrad Countries were made competi-
tors in certain economic sectors (steel production, agriculture; Bársony, 1998).
Case study 2: Foreign investments
The shift of the Visegrad Four countries from state-controlled economies towards 
market competition can be seen as a considerable policy paradigm change, which 
not only altered the economic policy goals and means but also revised the values and 
beliefs that characterized the Central European way of thinking prior to the regime 
change in 1990 (Drahokoupil, 2009:57). In order to help develop their industrial 
bases, the Visegrad Countries tried to attract as much foreign direct investments as 
possible. V4 governments have been in constant competition for equity capital, rein-
vested earnings and other capital originating from other, mostly Western countries 
(Drahokoupil, 2009:23–31). Investors were initially attracted by the relative institu-
tional advantages of the Visegrad region (new liberal regulations, exploitable cheap 
and skilful workforce, capital attraction policies, numerous unexploited market op-
portunities etc.).
In 2016 Prague reported USD 115,204 million FDI stock, which represented 59.7 
per cent of the country’s annual GDP. For the same period Budapest calculated 
USD 77,721 million FDI stock, equal to 61.8 per cent of the GDP. In Poland the figure 
was USD  185,903 million in 2016 representing the 39.8 per cent of the respective 
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gross domestic product. Bratislava recorded an FDI stock of USD 41,615 million for 
2016 giving the 46.5 per cent of the country’s GDP. The figures inserted below show 
us a three-year tendency dated from 2015 to 2017.7
Figure 3: FDI stock in USD (2015–2017)
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Figure 4: FDI stock in  per cent of GDP (2015–2016)
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As the V4 Countries’ heavy reliance on foreign capital inflows has made them 
competitors in the European market they have never harmonized their policies in the 
field of FDI attraction. Each V4 states have developed strategies principally driven by 
industrial growth that followed transnational trends and policies. In this latter process 
international institutions have played a considerable role (Drahokoupil, 2009:55). 
For a better understanding of the centripetal and centrifugal forces among V4 states, 
below is the theoretical background of these four countries’ supranational intergov-
ernmental political cooperation.
A theoretical point of view
In a long-term perspective, any inter-state cooperation be effective if the states in-
volved choose their partners carefully and do not force the harmonization of political 
actions where their interests do not necessarily meet. Multilateral partnership within 
international political platforms is considered as a main vehicle for advancing the key 
foreign policy interests of states with relatively weak decision-making positions (such 
as CEE countries) on a global scale. A harmonized cooperation along shared interests 
can be used in a “smart” way to compensate for small size and the absence of powerful 
means of pursuing international policies, thus allowing small states to punch above 
their real weights. The interest endorsement system of international organizations 
(such as the EU) forces states with relatively modest political weight to form alliances 
with other less powerful countries that are also in weak positions in comparison to 
larger powers that can exert higher influence in global or continental policy-making. 
The ability of states with relatively weak political positions to shape the political agen-
da at supranational levels may thus be strengthened and these governments may gain 
comparative advantages by harmonizing their actions.8 
According to structural realists, the basic factor in the structure of an international 
system is the division of power and not the common goals, shared interests, mutual 
dependence and similar positions of the cooperating states (Waltz, 1979:17–30). Neo-
liberal institutionalism assumes that states focus primarily on their absolute gains, and 
emphasizes the prospects for cooperation, while structural realism supposes that states 
are largely concerned with relative gains and points out the prospects for conflict. The 
followers of the latter school think that the more states care about relative gains, the 
more a gain for one state tends to be seen as a loss by others and the more difficult coop-
eration will be (Powell, 1991:1). This statement is underpinned by the fact that Visegrad 
Countries have been competitors in attracting foreign investment, as discussed above.9
During the first 25 years, the V4 platform did not intend to integrate other CEE states 
in the coalition, nor did they want to extend the synergies beyond the most obvious com-
mon goals of the governments involved. States cooperate multilaterally as long as the 
synchronization of their political movements generates relatively equal profits for each 
(Caporaso, 1992:8-9). During their accession to the European Union the Visegrad Coun-
tries proved to be unable to agree on a joint negotiating position and to assume the lead-
ership of a bloc of candidates that would be a natural centre of gravity (Žantovský, 2006).
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Figure 5: IR theory mind map
Source: Edited by the author 
Conclusion
The V4 Countries are looking for points of convergence, possibilities to reconcile and 
express their respective individual positions in order to formulate a joint one. The 
Visegrad Group has not become a compulsory negotiating forum, nor has it grown 
to be a well-institutionalized international organization either. The slightly different 
geopolitical determinations and the constant competition for foreign investors have 
been some of the major factors that prevented the V4 Countries from finding the 
attributes necessary for a predominant regional political entity (a better institutional-
ized cooperation, more willingness to compromise etc.). Institutional neoliberalism 
says that a higher level of transnational relations between countries once occurred 
cannot be ignored anymore. The accession of the Visegrad Countries to NATO and 
the EU required increased government interactions between Poles, Czechs, Hungar-
ians and Slovaks, however, the competition and discrepancies in geopolitical aims 
prevented them from finding appropriate ways to handle existing conflicts and ten-
sions. Nevertheless, by its successful security and economic integration Visegrad has 
become a good example, a model that was followed by the other candidates to join 
NATO and the EU.
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Notes
1  The thoughts and views set out in this study constitute the author’s opinion and do not necessarily re-
flect the official view of the Hungarian State Railways or the Corvinus University of Budapest.
2  Acknowledgements to Professor István TÓZSA (National University of Public Service) for his valuable 
advice. All the graphs and diagrams in this text were created and designed by the author.
3  During foreign policy crises, Hungary has traditionally looked to Germany, the Czechs and Slovaks to 
Russia, and Poland to France, the United Kingdom or the United States (Čarnogurský, 2006).
4  EUROSTAT: Population 2017, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=t-
ps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1.
5  TRACECA is an internationally recognized program aimed at strengthening the economic relations, 
trade and transport communication in the regions of the Black Sea basin, South Caucasus and Central 
Asia. (TRACECA, 2017)
6  Via Carpathia includes prospects currently under discussion for the construction of branches to neighbo-
ring countries like Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey, Macedonia, Albania (Centre for Transport Strategies, 2016)
7  Santander Trade Portal, Foreign Investment. Czech Republic: https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/
establish-overseas/czech-republic/foreign-investment, Hungary: https://en.portal.santandertrade.
com/establish-overseas/hungary/foreign-investment, Poland: https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/
establish-overseas/poland/foreign-investment, Slovakia: https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/estab-
lish-overseas/slovakia/investing.
8  Hence it can be asserted that states in relatively weak political positions have to cooperate more actively 
than the larger powers within international organizations where the outcomes are products of interac-
tions between actor preferences and institutional rules.
9  Competition, however, is inherent in the European integration and contributes to the development of 
CEE market economies which may be considered as an absolute gain for all V4 countries (Balogová, 2008).
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